



Oxford Paperbacks now begin a bigger, more varied publishing programme. The series has been redesigned and its range widened; 50-60 titles will join it every year from now on, new books as well as reprints and new, cheaper editions of books from the World's Classics, Oxford Standard Authors, Oxford English Novels, and other sections of the Oxford backlist.

The first 26 titles in the expanded series are published today. They include Sir Geoffrey Keynes's edition of the *Complete Writings of William Blake* and three other Oxford Standard Authors collections (Milton, Wordsworth, and Coleridge); a new book by Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in South-East Asia*, and a new edition of David Thomson's *Democracy in France Since 1870*, both published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs; reprints of Winifred Gérin's *Charlotte Brontë* and Mario Praz's classic study *The Hero in Eclipse in Victorian Fiction*; and two new collections of plays, *Jacobean Tragedies*, edited by A. H. Gomme, and *Burlesque Plays of the Eighteenth Century*, edited by Simon Trussler. All the new Oxford Paperbacks—classic novels, short stories, poetry, drama, history, politics, current affairs, economics, art, religion—are now in bookshops.

- 152 *Charlotte Brontë: The Evolution of Genius* Winifred Gérin 17/-
- 153 *War and Peace in South-East Asia* Peter Lyon 15/-
- 162 *European Vision and the South Pacific 1768-1850* Revised Edition 28/-
- 163 *A Theory of Economic History* Sir John Hicks 10/- (13 October)
- 164 *The Legacy of Greece* Edited by Sir Richard Livingstone 12/-
- 165 *Shelley: Selected Poetry* Edited by Neville Rogers 17/-
- 173 *French Literature and its Background Volume 5: The Late Nineteenth Century* Edited by John Crankshaw 13/-
- 174 *The Early Christian Fathers* Selected and translated by Henry Bettenson 15/-
- 175 *The Hero in Eclipse in Victorian Fiction* Mario Praz 15/-
- 176 *Diplomacy Sir Harold Nicolson* 7/-
- 177 *J. M. Synge: Plays* Edited by Ian Sadkanyan 10/-
- 178 *Chekhov: Short Plays* Translated and edited by Ronald Hingley 6/-
- 179 *Plays: A Phoenix Too Frequent; Thine, With Angels; The Lady's Not for Burning* Christopher Fry 8/-
- 180 *Jacobean Tragedies* Edited by A. H. Gomme 13/-
- 181 *Eighteenth Century Comedy* W. D. Taylor's selection, newly edited by Simon Trussler 13/-
- 182 *Burlesque Plays of the Eighteenth Century* Edited by Simon Trussler 10/-
- 183 *Katherine Mansfield: Selected Stories* Chosen by D. M. Davin 12/-
- 185 *The Red Badge of Courage and Other Stories* Stephen Crane 10/-
- 186 *Ruana: The Fortunate Mistress* Daniel Defoe 10/-
- 187 *The Castle of Dracula* Horace Walpole 6/-
- 188 *The Adventures of Peregrine Pickle* Tobias Smollett 22/-
- 189 *Castle Rackrent* Maria Edgeworth 6/-
- 190 *Blake: Complete Writings* Edited by Geoffrey Keynes 22/-
- 191 *Coleridge: Poetical Works* Edited by Ernest Hartley Coleridge 15/-
- 192 *Wordsworth: Poetical Works* Edited by Thomas Hutchinson, revised by Ernest de Selincourt 15/-
- 193 *Milton: Poetical Works* Edited by Douglas Bush 18/-
- 194 *Democracy in France Since 1870* David Thomson 14/-

Oxford University Press

affairs to which the intellectual is held to be indissolubly linked. One day the regime of truth will emerge, when the masks, the hypocrisies, the false consciousness have withered away. The world is going somewhere, there is a definable historical process, and the scholar or thinker must help it get there.

This can be presented not as a political but a natural or a moral imperative. By this means, intellectual disinterestedness can neatly become its obverse—commitment—without "losing its emphatic moral note. As for the cultural-intellectual dialogue, the plural debate, this can be seen not as an important social function, a recognition of multiplicity, but simply as a dialectic, moving in a single direction. Indeed, the open liberal discourse of contending viewpoints can come to be regarded not as a valid dialogue of the mind, or an essential attribute of the university, but as an obstruction. The only true dialogue is then between those in the know—the "dissenting academy", the consensus of a radicalized university—and a society outside it. If there are, within the university, those who disagree with the revealed truths of radicalized learning, they are not maintaining a profitable dialogue but bucksliding, obscuring the issue out of perversity, interest, or intellectual or humane inadequacy.

Views of this sort are particularly prevalent among student radicals, but they are shared by numbers of university teachers of millennialist bias. And today they must have inevitable appeal to certain others who are worried by the self-evident structural inadequacies of the liberal university in contemporary society—particularly, of course, in the United States.

Many traditional ideas of academic freedom and scholarly detachment, like many of the essential values of civilization itself, have received severe shocks in recent years. Indeed the university has been a sensitive testing-point of what is happening to modern humanism. A good many of these shocks have derived from the character of modern democratic society, and its changing views of learning and the educational process in general. The universities have been pulled into the realm of public policy in all sorts of ways, some direct, some subtly indirect, some apparently desirable, others less so. They have been asked to change their standards, to raise them, to lower them, to maintain them on less money. They have been asked to produce social elites, academic and intellectual elites, meritocratic elites, managerial elites, weapons-systems, and more cultivated mothers. They have been asked to take in the intelligent who are not motivated, and the motivated who are not intelligent. They have been asked to serve the varying ambitions of parents and of their children. They have been asked to support the prevailing order and culture, and to change it.

The most important thing about these pressures, many of them so various as to permit the university to pursue its own ways regardless, has been less their nature than the very fact that they exist. For the university has become a "public" matter—has become news, has become subject to public accountability in more than the simple fiscal sense, has become not an autonomous and secluded community but a scrutinized and an employed institution. Last year the Law School of the University of Illinois presented, with it is worth noting, the support of Sperry and Hutchinson, of trading-stamp fame—four lectures now collected in book-form as *Dimensions of Academic Freedom*. In the first lecture, Professor Walter P. Metzger argues that the most significant change in the modern American university was that it had been "decolonized", with serious consequences for the whole idea of academic freedom. "Richer, larger, more complex than ever before, the typical modern institution of higher learning is less self-directed than ever before."

In this country we often think of the American university, with its much higher degree of private bene-

faction and its nexus at "private" colleges, as much more independent than our contemporary universities, heavily government-financed and protected only by the rather fragile buffer of the U.C.A.C. In many ways this is true, but the American university has historically had rather less protection than our own, especially because it has existed in a democratic society in which there has not been for a long time a privileged cultural class, and because American society has tended towards an "historical" character, in an acceptance of the pressures of the times and the majority. It has made a virtue of usable knowledge, a speciality of technological innovation, and has brought into the purview of higher education many subjects of doubtful humanistic validity, credits in skin-diving counting as an egregious example. It has maintained an expansion close to demand, and many universities have enforced only the most nominal selection standards. The term "university" has covered many activities, many different standards of activity, and an enormous spectrum of institutions.

Its professional standards have, in many institutions, been appreciably qualified. Many of those who teach in American universities are indistinguishable in human style and extra-mural values from the car-salesman next door. Professional competence is pulled by abstract tests, the hurdle of the Ph.D., the obligation to publish whatever where, and so on. The ideals of scholarship are appropriately Germanic in character: a strong emphasis on methodology and specialism, a heavy research focus, and a fascination with abstract theological crises tend to make academic and scholarly activity into, basically, a technique. The skills themselves are fairly open ones and are not particularly central in character, cultivation or life-style. Nor, in a climate where the academic demand seems always to call forth the supply, are they considered particularly prestigious or rare. To say this is not to belittle the quality of the leading American universities, or the leading teachers, but to generalize about the broader academic situation in a society in which many of the institutions characterized as universities would not (at least yet) be so characterized in many other countries, including our own.

Professor Metzger's lecture touches on some of these issues, but in particular he focuses on the way in which the expansion of the American university, while freeing it from certain native and traditional intrusions from outside, has opened it in many more, its extraterritorial condition has been heavily eroded, the essential decisions transferred outside the immediate community. State bodies administer huge conglomerates of institutions (SUNY—The State University of New York—took over forty-six existing institutions). The civil power has been introduced into campus as a result of student take-overs, not so much proving (as the radicals say) as forcing dependence on external authority. Federal government and state government sources meet many essential costs and, of course, sponsor research activity, some 10 per cent of this total being avowedly associated with "defence" projects. The university has fed advisers to business and government.

Indeed, what Professor Metzger calls "decolonization" is almost a necessary condition of the modern expansionist trend in university education. As the size of the plant and the community extend, the total capital investment in a university becomes socially crucial. As the number of subjects studied and disciplines contained expands, it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish whether they are appropriate to the total "overview" of a university: indeed it becomes harder for an overview to exist. Growing without defined purpose, it becomes part of the mesh of business and government. Proliferating plant, students, faculty and administration, it becomes an enormous complex which, "hus to be" rationalized and "systematized", which is to say run on the model of the large corporation. It ceases to be a community, a society of

shared assumptions; it abstract mechanism; it environment for conduct; it becomes necessary, it is in a privileged sense, it is in societies administered in manners.

So are the faculty, particularly, Sanford H. Kadish, his essay in the volume a lessor strike. There is a human or in moral-dilemma to centre in the left hand, a community that anyone might or internalize. And the dilemma, a professionally delocated man, identifies the culture of the particular community he happens to be in, the culture of his grade, of period-specialism, of silencing absence of dealings between colleague or colleague and suggested in a quotation electronic teaching aid, culled by one of the ones.

The Dissenting Academy remedial exercise in regional situation: a collection of various hands, for disciplines, it is also a new series of antitheses, appears in England with jacket bound from L. Williams and its purpose, the academic particularity, to its duties, it can be virtuous and well-meaning essays. "The Responsibility of the Intellectual", by Norman F. Cantor, is a comprehensive account of created a stir in its first-40 in *The New York Review* with its accusation that American intellectuals were implicated in a secret and concealment about the nature of the Vietnam war. It is in fact the crunch, and this makes an intellectual lapse but a failure of obligation—not truth, but to the intellect, which is that of "reason".

United States, the intellectual, as well as the economic conditions, permit this country to pursue modernization and development commensurate with its wealth and technical capacity. The implied historicist note the various moments which gives the mission of most of this collection. The need for academic definition being what it is, few agree with many of its premises, demands "moral responsibility" and "free play of mind" doing, calls up all the wasted and corrupted intellect. There is an inspired passion for instance, Theodore Reeser for a return to the traditional sceptical philosophies which even carry us to agreeing that assumption that promotes much on publication and research activities like mustering anti-capital-punishment efforts. Most of the intellectual activity conceived are rather of the thought must lead to radicalism or the "unmasking" of the bias of much modern research. It is presented in these essays, a highly predictable form. The never-forgoes, though it sometimes does interestingly unmasked.

Most of the essays are apart from Professor Chomsky, only one that is really very, opaque piece, from the "kinson", who offers the illuminating comment on the "war": "The war is a society whose own control and destruction of the real power of the world is undecidable." Other than

society is held to be administered with moral blindness or hypocrisy and the only right locale for is in league with a revolution-ary future. While most of the pieces penetrate into the timeliness and the moral inertia of various regimes, they tend to do so from a standpoint of a fashionable analysis. The forces creating human or in moral-dilemma to centre in the left hand, a community that anyone might or internalize. And the dilemma, a professionally delocated man, identifies the culture of the particular community he happens to be in, the culture of his grade, of period-specialism, of silencing absence of dealings between colleague or colleague and suggested in a quotation electronic teaching aid, culled by one of the ones.

The Dissenting Academy has a friendly relationship, computer that a teacher of time for. In other words, find wrong with the modernity what is wrong with

The Dissenting Academy remedial exercise in regional situation: a collection of various hands, for disciplines, it is also a new series of antitheses, appears in England with jacket bound from L. Williams and its purpose, the academic particularity, to its duties, it can be virtuous and well-meaning essays. "The Responsibility of the Intellectual", by Norman F. Cantor, is a comprehensive account of created a stir in its first-40 in *The New York Review* with its accusation that American intellectuals were implicated in a secret and concealment about the nature of the Vietnam war. It is in fact the crunch, and this makes an intellectual lapse but a failure of obligation—not truth, but to the intellect, which is that of "reason".

United States, the intellectual, as well as the economic conditions, permit this country to pursue modernization and development commensurate with its wealth and technical capacity. The implied historicist note the various moments which gives the mission of most of this collection. The need for academic definition being what it is, few agree with many of its premises, demands "moral responsibility" and "free play of mind" doing, calls up all the wasted and corrupted intellect. There is an inspired passion for instance, Theodore Reeser for a return to the traditional sceptical philosophies which even carry us to agreeing that assumption that promotes much on publication and research activities like mustering anti-capital-punishment efforts. Most of the intellectual activity conceived are rather of the thought must lead to radicalism or the "unmasking" of the bias of much modern research. It is presented in these essays, a highly predictable form. The never-forgoes, though it sometimes does interestingly unmasked.

Most of the essays are apart from Professor Chomsky, only one that is really very, opaque piece, from the "kinson", who offers the illuminating comment on the "war": "The war is a society whose own control and destruction of the real power of the world is undecidable." Other than

Most of the essays are apart from Professor Chomsky, only one that is really very, opaque piece, from the "kinson", who offers the illuminating comment on the "war": "The war is a society whose own control and destruction of the real power of the world is undecidable." Other than

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

democratic involvement in the hideous operational wrongs of the Vietnam War (Project Camelot, for example) on intellectual and moral inadequacy and inertia. But this is to miss much of its real significance. For many of the intellectuals and liberals who have supported the administration over the Vietnam War were—and the record is there in the magazines and polemics of the 1940s and 1950s—themselves no supporters of the status quo. They were "critical" intellectuals who had, and presumably have, versions of the intellectual obligation toward the future. Their so-called "counter-revolutionary" attitudes were, in a number of cases, themselves theories of the historical process, a belief that there was a genuinely liberal and individualistic alternative to the Marxist view of history. It not only was, but is, a hope we can value: and the crucial distinction between those who spoke for this (not all of whom supported Vietnam) and most of the present contributors is simply that theirs was a different version of historical progress, a different configuration for

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960

General Editors: PETER DUGNAN and L. H. GANN

Editorial Board: P. J. HALL (U.S.A.), LONDON, A. CRAIG (Stanford), L. D. LAM (Birmingham), D. J. ARNOLD (Harvard). A four-volume collaborative history of modern Africa sponsored by the Hoover Institution of Stanford University in California. The aim is to provide an up-to-date analysis of what is known about recent African history. These later volumes will cover the political history from 1914 to 1960, economic history and social change during the colonial period. A fifth volume will be bibliographical.

First volume in the series
Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914

Edited by L. H. GANN and PETER DUGNAN

In this volume a group of leading scholars provide an authoritative account of the political history of Africa in the opening years of the colonial era. £3 net

To be published in 1970:
Volume 2: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960



Jonathan Swift
A Critical Introduction
DENIS DONOGHUE

A concise critical survey challenging some of the commonest assumptions in the modern reception of Swift and questioning the widespread view that Swift is to be understood in terms of irony, persona, or mask. 45s. net

Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-1966

PETER KILBY

A detailed study of how manufacturing and processing industries have developed in the largest country of West Africa, examined within its historical framework. Dr Kilby shows that the experience of Nigeria's industrialization challenges conventional development theory. 95s. net

Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics
Idealism, Politics and History
Sources of Hegelian Thought
GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY

A wide-ranging and scholarly analysis of the meeting of two vital themes in the French Revolutionary period: intellectual and moral perceptions of history and patterns of political values and beliefs in idealist political systems. Professor Kelly argues that a close exploration of the former is crucial to our understanding of political philosophy at the end of the Age of Reason. He traces his central preoccupation through a sequence of linked studies of Rousseau, Kant, Pichard and Hegel. £4 net

Shcherbatov: On the Corruption of Morals in Russia

Edited and translated by ANTONY LENTIN

The most celebrated work of the Russian historian, philosopher and publicist, Prince M. M. Shcherbatov (1733-90), described as 'one of the most interesting conservative critics of Catherine and Peter and the effects of Europe on Russia'. A complete English translation faces the Russian text and Dr Lentin also provides a long introductory essay and extensive notes. 10s

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Just for the record

Heinemann

هذا من الأصل

The way of decay

HENRI CHARRIERE: *Papillon*. 516pp. Paris: Lattol. 28fr.

For many weeks now this book has topped the best-seller list in France, and it is even rumoured to have been chosen as holiday reading by the President of the Republic. One can easily understand why. It is, in the first place, a marvellous adventure story told in a direct, colloquial style, as if it had been spoken into a tape-recorder by a born teller of tales. Secondly, it is an account of incredible suffering and resourcefulness, in total contrast to the average experiences of civilized life. M. Charrière is what the French call *une nature*, i.e., a strongly marked personality with a tremendous fund of temperament and courage. Although he came from a respectable family, as a young man he got himself involved in crime, in circumstances which he leaves completely vague, and was eventually condemned to life imprisonment in French Guyana, after being convicted for murder. This book is the record of his experiences during the twelve years or so between the passing of the sentence in Paris in 1931 and M. Charrière's final achievement of freedom in Venezuela during the Second World War. A convict who takes to writing makes one think immediately of Jean Genet, but it is doubtful whether M. Charrière has ever heard of his illustrious predecessor, who must be a near contemporary. The admitted stimulus was *L'Assommoir*, by the late Albertine Sarrazin, and she, of course, may have been encouraged by Genet's example. M. Charrière happened to see *L'Assommoir* in Caracas and to learn that it had brought in a lot of money for its author. Since he was in financial difficulties, he thought that his much more extraordinary adventures

might also be turned to good account and, in time-honoured fashion, he wrote them down in a series of exercise-books and despatched them to publishers. We are assured in an editorial note that the text is more or less in its original state, and has only been pruned of a few obscure doubts, because conversations of thirty or forty years ago are given verbatim and some of the tropical episodes are strikingly reminiscent of eighteenth-century novels about Frenchmen in exotic climes. But perhaps one's suspicions are unjustified. M. Charrière stresses that, as a convict, he ruminates endlessly on his past, rehearsing in his mind all the things that had happened to him; and a man mad, it is a great mental discipline, if it does not make him, after all, like a myth with a foundation in fact.

"Papillon" was M. Charrière's name in the *nulien*, because he had a butterfly tattooed on his chest. He claims that he was entirely innocent of the killing for which he was condemned; another criminal had been blackmailed by the police into giving false evidence, and the prosecuting counsel was more skilled and unscrupulous than the defence. But M. Charrière was fortunate in going to the penitentiary colony with an intense sense of grievance. He was determined to survive and escape in order to return to Paris and slaughter all the people concerned with his condemnation. This murderous ambition filled his waking hours, polarized his personality and ensured that he was perfectly "motivated".

The major events in the tale are the attempted escapes, which were extraordinarily ingenious, in themselves and led to fantastic adventures. For instance, M. Charrière lived alone for several months, with a savage

Indian tribe, which adopted him and provided him with two wives. At a later stage, he set up house in Georgetown with a Hindu girl, whose father was a scrooge. On yet another occasion, he collaborated with a Chinese charcoal-burner living on an island in the middle of a swamp, passable only in the wake of a pet pig which could sense where the ground had temporarily solidified. Even if some of these stories seem worthy of Baron Münchhausen or Casanova, it must be admitted that M. Charrière makes a very good job of them. Cliché, the charcoal-burner with the pet pig, who disposes of intruders by murdering them and putting their bodies to smoulder along with his wood, is unforgettable whether as a reality or an invention. So is the Colombian drug-smuggler through which the tide rises twice a day, flooding the eels to waist height and driving up a herd of rats; or the Irish nuns who smuggle a group of escapees through a customs post in their convent cart but are so upset nervously that they have to jump into the bushes immediately afterwards to relieve themselves.

But the main impression that remains is of the appalling underworld of crime and punishment — "le chemin de la pourriture", as M. Charrière calls it. No doubt society must be policed, yet prisons and penitentiary colonies are like some boarding-schools, rotting dumps where moral and psychological decay spread apace. In Europe, they are no doubt bad enough, but in the wider and more primitive conditions of South America the conditions seem to be unspeakable. Even so, some loyalties survive. And M. Charrière, who believes in the possibility of redemption and not like Genet, in the nihilistic destruction of society, tells some remarkable stories about honour among thieves and murderers. But more typical is a macabre tale about an escaped convict with a wooden leg, who murdered his boy-lover in order to eat him, when food was short. Later, other members of the escape party murdered him in his turn and used the wooden leg to roast his flesh. When the group were recaptured, and the facts became known the other convicts had lots of laughs.

Crime in short

DESMOND BAGLEY: *The Spoilers*. 317pp. Collins. 25s.

A rich man's daughter dies in heroin-induced squalor. Her death and the distinctive character of her doctor are sufficiently well and realistically established for the novel to hold its own. The doctor becomes a fairly conventional anti-drug-trader hero in the Middle East. And Mr. Bagley still has original tricks to play, such as full directions on how to smuggle concealed arms in a Land Rover, and how always to win at tossing coins by use of games theory — though the present reviewer's own trial of the latter was inconclusive.

LILIAN JACKSON BRAUN: *The Cat Who Turned On and Off*. 192pp. Collins. 21s.

Miss Braun knows about cats, journalism and antiquities, and has used them all in this thriller, just as the blurb claims. Her stories about aging detective Quilleran and his detective Siamese are a bit glib, but likeable by anyone who likes rather old-fashioned American lody-written detection.

KENNETH GILES: *Death Grecks a Battle*. 192pp. Gollancz. 25s.

Jollier but less farcical, less dyspeptic and uxorious than of late (but wives cannot have babies for ever), Inspector Henry James is back to words his old form in this nicely com-

Primary games

RALPH HARPER: *The World of Two*. 139pp. Cleveland: Casanova Western Roseville University Press (American University Publishers Group). £2 7s.

To end a critique of the thriller with parallels to St. John of the Cross and the dark night of the soul is, on the face of it, ridiculous. But with interpretive as opposed to analytic criticism the writer may make what pattern he convinces himself. All that can be demanded is that the patterns are drawn from fair use of the material, and that they are illuminating. On both counts Mr. Harper's book succeeds surprisingly well.

The material he uses is limited and classic, ranging from *The Riddle of the Sphinx* through Thucydides, Ambler, Greene to Le Carré and Fleming. The parallels he finds it proper to draw, from Plato to Kafka and Sartre, are impressive but, in the event, unimpressive. Mr. Harper does not see the thriller as "escape" literature in any pejorative sense of the word; he early makes the simple point that among his devotees are many who need no escape from reality. That it offers satisfactory patterning of the chaos that is life is obvious, that it is, in a sense, "the very opposite of what Camus called 'the absurd'". Mr. Harper grants that the thriller is an aspect of, in Tolkien's phrase, the primary world, the world of many people's private fantasies; but a world richer, less boring than our own fantasies, usually become. Yet it is also in direct relation to our contemporary world in that it is a crisis literature, the literature that has "arisen in the same century as a crisis theology and an existentialist philosophy". Importantly, the thriller is about identity and loneliness.

In this situation of our times, the thriller exists as something of a *Pilgrim's Progress* (one parallel Mr. Harper does not draw, presenting examples of courage and responsibility, of moral choice and action in a sphere where deceit is a necessary weapon. Yet it is certain, he asks, that our identification is always with the hero? Not only may our distinction of good and bad be no more

than the decision to act, and ourselves good, but, as Ambler introduced the detective, "the danger is that we shall become like him". On almost every page Mr. Harper's stimulating thoughts are explored — over-ingeniously — often just beneath the surface of the material. For instance, Harper frequently refers to King's description of the "Great Game" as an invention by Kipling. As it was used long before Kipling, it is a possibility of defining games — even games may be, in a sense, a new for the most part short-lived. But now for years, like many other party games, it has been in vogue, and its sense of purpose waiting, until finally I have decided on a ruthless stocktaking.

What is a painful business in question assumptions on the life work has been based upon one's self to charges of falsity from old friends and acquaintances. Another facet of the thriller is the kind of man he ends up as. Comment on "a good man in a bad world" says less than has recently been suggested. The reality than Le Carré's great virtue who wouldn't have been one in the type conditions of news, deceit, loss of identity, is no doubt which type of the own critics prefer. Do not in this case, lead us to another

There is another kind of Mr. Harper sometimes appears without notice, language of chivalry. Another parallel worth mentioning: Arthurian romance, there is M. dominating the narrative. Taran Round Table of old men, pushing them out to sea with decent, dignified and the threats in Camelot; at times they are disgraced, at times they get a desert. Sometimes glimpse the Mr. Harper could set his page. Hopkins may more exercises than retelling *El* as a modern thriller, or even an Arthurian romance.

to advantage in this story, a mutant agent, and an escapee from a Russian labour camp. Miss Mince lacks what his book too more than formal help people.

JACK NICKLE SMITH: *Is the Miss Finch?* 150pp. 10s. 25s.

Are women spies presented to be the new spy thing in the Miss Finch is the third to go, and this jolly little tale supports supposition.

RHONA PETRIE: *Despatch*. 192pp. Gollancz. 25s.

When, with her, had books, Petrie invented *Nassim*. It would be, British, *Sahel* working in, *Genève*, many others (including this one) more of him. Miss Petrie has but Petrie seems to have quickish, individually, and only another "editorial" anxious to settle the of a decent real British, become involved in, and hardly less amazing than *Is Revealed*.

RENN, YASHKIN: *Mar*. 149pp. 10s. 25s.

Treasure is the treasure of the mind, not of the pocket, and the development of the Russian novel.

The stuff of politics

STOPHER MAYHEW: *Party*. 176pp. Hutchinson. 30s.

A scrupulous person whose has through the years been away inch by inch until he either leave his church or find a way of making a new surrender of spirit. Mr. Christopher May has been in torment about Party and about his own as a socialist politician. He is that.

He has a Labour supporter since having stuck my first blows for by selling subversive pamphlets my perfect study at school; but doubts which have occasionally in since I have for the most part short-lived. But now for years, like many other party games, it has been in vogue, and its sense of purpose waiting, until finally I have decided on a ruthless stocktaking.

What is a painful business in question assumptions on the life work has been based upon one's self to charges of falsity from old friends and acquaintances.

What, then, are Mr. May's new hopes for tomorrow, after the lies between Labour and the unions have been weakened and after it has at last sunk in that electors vote not as producers but as consumers? He hopes for a Labour Party with a lower, more informal relation with the unions: "a party which is unopinionated, tolerant, classless, decentralized, held together by the radical temper of its membership rather than by political dogma or class interests"; and he hopes for a form of politics in which there will be an end to the sham of all-out party warfare "when the real difference between the parties no longer justifies it". The political system is antiquated and the present party confrontation is sterile.

Almost every politician worth his salt would admit the cogency of some of Mr. May's attacks on the lies and hypocrisies of party politics during the past twenty years. He is not the first, nor will he be the last, to be sickened by them. There is a profound sense in which it may be said that

There is no longer any meaningful difference in attitude or ideology between

the parties. Their records have a deadly similarity; the debates between them are sterile; their rivalry inhibits new ideas or political alliances; they frustrate the expression of opinion in Parliament; they prop up incompetent Ministers; they waste the time and energy of Ministers and M.P.s alike; they divide the nation.

Yet Mr. May's denunciation of our political system and practice needs, in fairness to his party and party leaders, to be placed in a personal context. He is, after all, a Minister who resigned on a thoroughly sound issue, and who later, as a past its peak, had the bitter experience of seeing the Cabinet accept the withdrawal from East of Suez for which he had argued in vain. No politician of Mr. May's high intelligence and principle could suffer that without psychological trauma. The author's restraint in dealing with this particular episode is admirable, but it must still influence his general argument.

It is also painful to place Mr. May's denunciation of the party game in the full political context. Whatever the faults of the system

All these hopes have moved me at one time or another during the past 32 years, and they have all proved false. To the extent that we cling to them today we condemn ourselves to further dismay, frustration, and disillusion.

What, then, are Mr. May's new hopes for tomorrow, after the lies between Labour and the unions have been weakened and after it has at last sunk in that electors vote not as producers but as consumers? He hopes for a Labour Party with a lower, more informal relation with the unions: "a party which is unopinionated, tolerant, classless, decentralized, held together by the radical temper of its membership rather than by political dogma or class interests"; and he hopes for a form of politics in which there will be an end to the sham of all-out party warfare "when the real difference between the parties no longer justifies it". The political system is antiquated and the present party confrontation is sterile.

Almost every politician worth his salt would admit the cogency of some of Mr. May's attacks on the lies and hypocrisies of party politics during the past twenty years. He is not the first, nor will he be the last, to be sickened by them. There is a profound sense in which it may be said that

There is no longer any meaningful difference in attitude or ideology between

The Athlone Press UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

The Christian Knowledge of God

P. OWEN

This book aims to discuss as rigorously as possible the Christian claim that God is transcendent and personal reality. The underlying thesis is that although God's existence cannot be logically demonstrated, it can be known by spiritual intuition, and Mr Owen seeks to show that intuition and the various forms of religious experience it generates are entirely reasonable. 485 111071 80s

The Poems of Thomas Hardy

CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

KENNETH MARSDEN

This new assessment of Hardy the poet studies the full range of his non-dramatic verse in the light of as much relevant evidence as possible. The argument is firmly pinned throughout to the analysis of many individual poems and to the discussion of the views of earlier critics. 485 111071 40s

Essays in Czech History

R. BETTS

Collection of essays by the late Professor Betts mainly on central and eastern European history, in particular the life and times of Jan Hus and the development of the Hussite movement. 485 111071 20s

Chronology of the Expanding World 1492-1762

Second in the series of chronologies edited by Neville Williams. 70s.

The events of three centuries year by year: arts, sciences, politics & people. "A boon to me, as it will be to others. I shall always keep it within reach." Hugh Trevor-Roper, *Sunday Times*

The First Volume

The Modern World

Now completely revised 60s. "Will be of value to historians at every level." Prof. Asa Briggs, Vice-Chancellor Univ. of Sussex.

Victorian Painters

Jeremy Maas

"A magnificently illustrated dealer's dictionary." John Dixon Hunt, *The Times*. "Seriously useful as well as attractive in appearance." Michael Levey, *The Observer*.

Richly illustrated, the index is excellent, a delight to read and an invaluable work of reference. *Art Review*, 17. 6s.

The Story of the Blues

Paul Oliver

"Not only Oliver's best book on the Blues, but the finest overall survey of the subject that has yet been written." *International Times*. "A book which will be read with a new interest in the history of the blues." *New York Times*. "Anyone with an interest in what's new in the blues can only ignore this book at their peril." Mike Raven, 60s.

Latin America: A cultural history

German Arciniegas

Translated by Joan Maclean. The ideas, influence, arts and customs of a sub-continent, now twenty-one republics, and Puerto Rico. A masterly presentation by a Columbian Ambassador and Minister of Education. 3 maps. 22 half-tones. 84s.

Ancient Civilizations series: two new volumes

Anatolia II

First Millennium BC to the end of the Roman period. Henri Metzger. Professor at the University of Lyons.

Rome

Gilbert Picard

Professor at the Sorbonne, Paris. Each volume, 160pp., approx. 25p. paper, 30p. cloth and 80p. hard cover. 100 illustrations. 60s.

Already published:

Central Asia

Alexander, Babylonians

Cyprus, Yavuz, Karagözü

The Far East

Raymond Bloch

Michel, Jacques, Sonstette

South Africa

Michael, Guyonov

David, Boris, Plotovsky

Raymond, Bloch, a study

in the history of the

archaeological research in

the subject of the

extraordinary people of the

ancient world, including

Anthony, Bowdler, Daily

epoch.

Barrie & P

The Cresset

New from Phaidon



The Art of Illumination

This rich and fascinating anthology of illuminated manuscripts from 6-16th century attempts to show in large scale illustrations and even enlarged details, what is modern and monumental in miniature painting. Includes not only pages from many great and familiar Bibles, Psalters, Gospel Books and Books of Hours, but also less well-known illustrations which are often profoundly imaginative and pictorially exciting. Introduction by Professor Aschmann and Professor d'Ancona. 64 pp. text, 126 plates (23 in colour). 12 x 9 in. September 18

Life in Medieval France

Joan Evans Third Edition For France the Middle Ages are the fountain of the French tradition. The author describes the elements of French medieval civilisation, from the death of Charlemagne and the establishment of the State of France to the beginning of the reign of Louis XII. Discusses the development and pattern of feudal society; life in the towns and countryside; the role of the monasteries; the Crusades and pilgrimages; the scholastic traditions and centres of education. 264 pp., 106 illus. (6 in colour). September 18

Phaidon Press Ltd. 5 Cromwell Place. London SW7

